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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
<iJC C:T:1TE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
HARVEY W. DORTON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19282 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, HARVEY W. DORTON, appeals from his 
conviction of the offense of Bail Jumping, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-312 (1953 as 
amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., presiding. 
Jumping. 
quilty. 
1983, to 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant was charged by Information with Bail 
On April 27, 1983, the jury returned a verdict of 
Appellant was subsequently sentenced on May 23, 
serve an indeterminate term of zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a re·:ersc1l of ·Juilt 
entered against him, and a new tr1c1l. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 5, 1981, the State of Utah commenced its 
prosecution of several first degree felony charges against 
Appellant. (Case CR-81-310; Attempted Criminal Homicide, 
Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Kidnapping, Aqqravated Robbery, 
and Aggravated Sexual Assault). Appellant was held in the 
Salt Lake County Jail until his preliminary hearing on 
February 2, 1981. Shortly after the hearing, he posted bond 
in the amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500) Dollars 
through Dewey's Bail Bonds, and was released from custody. 
His trial was scheduled for January 18, 1982, in 
Third District Court, the Bryant H. Croft presiding. 
(T. 11). Appellant appeared for trial on January 18. At the 
end of the day, Judge Croft ordered a recess until the 
following morning, January 19th. All involved with the case, 
including Appellant, were admonished to return to the court-
room the next day at 10:00 a.m. 'T. U). 
On Januar:; 19, ·'f.'' jiJ not 3PIJear for 
his trial. The State finislH'd its pr ,Jf the case 
without Appellant's ::ireserJc:c· 
convicted Appellant of the it·:· '.:.he :har 1es. 
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The Ccurt 
r 1, rred that a warrant be issued for Appellant's arrest. 
Approximately six months later, James R. Phelps, 
of Dewey's Bail Bonds, located Appellant in Houston, Texas. 
un ,Jilly 5, 1982, he traveled to Houston to apprehend Appellant. 
IT. 25). Appellant was surrendered by Mr. Phelps to the 
Houston Police Department and eventually returned to the 
State of Utah for sentencing. (T. 18). 
Based on these facts, Appellant was charged in the 
instant case with the offense of Bail Jumping, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-312 (1953 as amended). Trial was 
held on April 27, 1983. During the State's closing argument, 
County Attorney Rob Reese made the following statement: 
When he [Appellant] was arrested he gave 
no explanation as to what he was doing 
there, at least that is what Mr. Phelps 
told us, and there is no evidence here 
today that suggests that he had any legal 
justification for leaving. (T. 49). 
Defense counsel contemporaneously objected to the 
statement as being an improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to present evidence in his behalf. (T. 49). Later, 
')Ut of the presence of the jury, counsel made a Motion for 
a Mistrial based on Mr. Reese's comment. (T. 53). She 
argued that it was an improper comment on the defendant's 
silence and was thus grounds for a mistrial under 
-3-
the authority of Doyle v. Ohio. The Court took 
the motion under advisement. The jury 
of Bail Jumping and the Court subsequently denied defense 
counsel's Motion for Mistrial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL WHEN 
THE PROSECUTOR COMMENTED UPON APPELLANT'S 
POST ARREST SILENCE AND HIS FAILURE TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF AT TRIAL. 
Appellant asserts that the County Attorney's comments 
in closing argument constituted prejudicial error. Both 
comments, that the Appellant offered no explanation of his 
conduct when he was arrested, and further, that Appellant 
presented no evidence at trial, are constitutionally 
impermissible. They denied Appellant a fair trial. 
It is fundamental that a person has the right to 
remain silent when arrested and accused of a crime. Furthermore, 
his or her silence may not be used in an incriminating fashion 
to establish the commission of a crime. See U.S. Constitution, 
Amendment 5, and 14. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that where a defendant iw·okes the Fifth Amendment right 
to remain silent during tu s tr icil, the prosecutor may not comment 
on the assertion of this r;1 tffin ·:. Cali'Cornia, 380 U.S. 
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",·1 'J i L 9 G 5) • The Court has extended this principle to include 
1 ,,_,;t1,-ining and comment on a defendant's failure to make a 
m0 nt upon arrest, after Miranda warnings have been given. 
1,,,yle> v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 619 (1976). 
These rules and the policies to be served by the 
enforcement of them have been recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court. In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (1981), this Court 
reversed the defendant's conviction on the basis that the 
prosecution attempted, more than once, to put the defendant's 
post-arrest silence before the jury. 
The Court noted that the State not only elicited 
prejudicial testimony through its witnesses, but also argued 
the testimony in closing argument. The effect of the witnesses' 
testimony was diffused to some extent by the Court striking the 
testimony and admonishing the jury, but the effect of the 
comments in closing argument were not easily diffused and were 
highly prejudicial. The Court concluded that the "references 
to defendant's silence [were] fundamental error, which could 
have affected the result and [were] therefore prejudicial." 
Id. at 147. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor did what Wiswell 
rroh1bits. He argued the Appellant's post-arrest silence in 
rlrs1ny arqument. He said that when Appellant was arrested he 
c2':e Jp) explanation as to what he was doing in Texas. The 
continued on to make another prohibited argument, 
n,.t present in Wiswell's facts, that the defendant presented 
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no evidence at trial to suggest he h.:id lc,;.:il J•1st1f1cat1sn fe;r 
leaving. 
Both of these arguments arc const1tut1onally 
impermissible. The State was not precluded from arquing 
the Appellant's prearrest silence as it related to his non-
appearance at trial "without just cause", (See Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 65 L.Ed. 86 (1980) ), but the State clearly 
overstepped its bounds in arguing post-arrest silence and 
silence at trial. 
The prosecutor's conduct in the instant case 
constituted prejudicial error. The prosecutor asked the jury 
to infer that the Appellant was guilty because he failed to 
exculpate himself after he was arrested, and because he failed 
to offer evidence in his behalf at trial. As a result of the 
prosecutor's improper Argument, Appellant was deprived of 
a fair trial. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR USED THESE I:1PERJ.1ISSIBLE 
COMMENTS AND ARGUMENTS TO SUSTAIN A 
SUBSTANTIAL PART OF HIS BURDEN OF PROOF 
ON ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF 
BAIL JUMPING. 
In order for Appellant to be convicted of the crime of 
Bail Jumping, the State had to •:c;tahl ish each •1f several elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonabl•' cl• ,,i,t. These are: 
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1. That the defendant failed to appear at a 
time and place designated for his appearance; 
2. That the defendant had been released on 
bail on the condition that he subsequently 
appear upon a charge; 
3. That the charge or charges were felonies; 
4. That the defendant did so knowingly; 
5. That he did so without just cause. 
The crime cannot be proved without satisfactory 
proof, that is, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, of all the 
foregoing elements. The primary evidence offered and argued 
b;' the State of Element No. 5 was that Appellant failed to 
give an explanation as to what he was doing in Texas, and 
second, that he offered no evidence suggesting he had any 
legal justification for leaving. 
Since both of those arguments are constitutionally 
impermissible as comments upon the defendant's right to remain 
they surely cannot be offered as proof on one of the 
elements of the crime. This court should not allow the 
Prosecutor to sustain his burden of proving crucial elements 
b·; making improper and prejudicial arguments. The accused is 
entitled to rely on well-settled and thoroughly tested 
constitutional guarantees. If his or her silence is to become 
3 tool in the prosecutor's hands to make out his or her case, 
then the Fifth Amendment contains an empty principle indeed. 
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The prosecutor was free t'J dr:iw •)n 
that didn't run afoul of Appellant's const1tut1on:il pr•>tect1ons. 
He could have argued the Appellant's pre-a1 rest s1lenc1• to law 
enforcement as it related to the lack of legal justification 
(Jenkins v. Anderson, supra), and emphasized additional facts 
supporting the inference that Appellant had no good reason 
for failing to appear. But he was not at liberty to use 
the two impermissible arguments that he did in asking the jury 
to find "lack of just cause." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's right to remain silent, both after his 
arrest and during trial, were improperly commented on by the 
prosecutor in closing argument. This argument was not only 
impermissible and prejudicial, but it was used by him to sustain 
most of his burden of proof on one of the elements of Bail 
Jumping. He therefore failed to properly sustain his burden of 
proof of the crime of Bail The prosecutor's errors 
operated to deprive Appellant of a fair trial and he respectfully 
asks this Court to reverse his conviction, and to grant him a 
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, this of April, 1984. 
( 
l y< 
-9-
" I'-' U,·· ( JI _, 
J 
